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Abstract 
Using a unique individual level data on the membership of Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs) collected in 1994 from seven major urban centres in 
Ethiopia, we provide one of the few econometric tests of the economic theory of 
ROSCAs. In recognition of the heterogeneity of rosca types across space, we provide 
basic information about the characteristics of roscas in urban areas of Ethiopia. In 
addition, we use individual and household level data to describe the  characteristics of 
both rosca participants and non-participants. The findings from the descriptive part of 
the analysis indicate that most of the rosca members are female, relatively richer and 
the major motive to join roscas is to buy consumer durables. For instance, Over 45% 
of households reported that they joined roscas with a purpose to buy durables. In 
terms of frequency of saving, most rosca members tend to save weekly and monthly, 
the latter being the predominant choice and a non-negligible amount is being mobilise 
through the informal institutions. The econometric evidence shows an inverse 
relationship between volume of rosca contribution and size of rosca as predicted by 
theory. In addition, we find an inverse relationship between frequency of rosca 
draw/saving and amount of saving. The welfare position of the household-food 
expenditure- has been found to be a significant determinant of the volume of rosca 
contribution but not the decision to join rosca. Most of our findings are consistent with 
findings elsewhere. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Informal finance, once the preserve of anthropologists and sociologists, is 
progressively capturing the attention of a growing number of economists. The common 
view among economists is that informal credit markets are not competitive. In 
addition, government intervention is recommended by many to address imperfections 
and failures in the formal credit market (Besley, 1994). But subsidised government 
interventions also proved a failure mainly due to implementation inefficiency and 
informational uncertainty. It is well known fact that problems associated with 
informational asymmetries, moral hazard, adverse selection are difficult to interpret for 
the design of specific policies and institutions. Therefore given current knowledge and 
ambiguity of theory with respect to policy formulation and institutional design, more 
analysis of the performance of informal financial markets is crucial (Diagne and Zeller, 
2001; van den Brink and Chavas, 1997). There are probably two reasons for the 
growing interest to investigate informal finance among economists. First, the findings 
from field research in several developing countries suggest that the role of informal 
finance in resource mobilisation and resource allocation is quantitatively significant. 
Second, disappointment with the effectiveness of formal financial systems in fostering 
economic growth has led to a reevaluation of the role of informal finance (Callier, 
1990).  
 
One of the most important informal financial institutions is referred to as ROSCAs.  
These partnerships are formed by a group of participants who make regular 
contributions to a fund, which is given to each contributor in turn until each member 
has received the fund. The allocation procedure of the Rosca determines the net benefit 
that each member derives and is thus an important factor in the success of Roscas. 
Usually, the rosca leader
2
 or ‘banker’ decides the order of recipients, taking into 
account the latest information available on need or capacity to pay and thus 
minimising the risk of default. A random rosca (i.e. the common form of roscas in 
Ethiopia) allocates its pool of funds based on random drawing of lots, with the winning 
member receiving the pool for the specific period; this process is repeated with each 
previous recipient of the pool being excluded from the draw until each participant has 
received the pool once. A bidding rosca, is one where participants bid competitively 
for the pool which is allocated to the higher bidder. As in other roscas, participants 
receive the pool only once over the life of the specific rosca  and this form of rosca is 
common in Taiwan.  (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Besley et al, 1993). Low income 
countries have developed nonmarket institutions such as Roscas for coping with risk 
and to improve credit access. The fund collected from individual contributions by 
rosca members is a useful risk sharing arrangement esp. in the face of idiosyncratic 
risks. It can be used to purchase indivisible durable consumption goods and to smooth 
consumption during transitory shocks. Roscas bring borrowers and savers together, 
with early recipients of the fund/pot being borrowers and the late ones savers. Savings 
through roscas can be thought of as gains from trade that arise in inter-temporal 
contracting between individuals. 
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 The controversy surrounding the literature on the motives of rosca membership is 
active and researchers are continuously making contributions to the debate. The 
theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of roscas advances various  
reasons why individuals/households join roscas. The motives for rosca participation 
include, among others, the need to acquire consumer durables (Hinda and Kirton, 
1999; van den Brink and Chavas, 1997; Besley and Levenson, 1996; Levenson and 
Besley, 1996; Besley et al 1993); intrahousehold conflict in resource allocation 
(Anderson and Baland, 2002; Ardener and Burman, 1995); insurance (Klonner, 2003; 
Calomiris and Rajaraman, 1998); self-control over the use of funds in the presence of 
time inconsistent preferences (Gugerty, 2003) and handling social pressure (Ambec 
and Treich, 2003). After reviewing the debates in the literature, it is fair to conclude 
that no consensus on the issue of why agents save in roscas. In practice we observe 
individuals/household join roscas for multiple reasons without a focus exclusively on 
one motive as indicated in the brief review here.  
 
Roscas have interesting features. They tend to exploit a comparative advantage in 
monitoring and enforcement capacity.  The former has become known since 
Stiglitz(1990) as the peer monitoring view. Therefore, the very low default rate among 
members of these institutions is attributed from the absence of informational problems, 
such as adverse selection and moral hazard – problems that are responsible for the 
failure of banks and crop insurance schemes in LDCs and elsewhere. ROSCAs are 
common not only in LDCs but also in newly industrialised countries such as Taiwan 
and in developed countries such as the United states mainly formed by immigrant 
communities which are more likely to be rationed from the credit market (Handa and 
Kirton, 1999; Levenson and Besley, 1996; Besley, 1995; Srinivasan, 1995; Bonnet, 
1981; Besley et al 1993).   
 
 
 In Ethiopia, roscas are widespread both in urban and rural areas and are referred to as 
equb. Households participate in equbs regardless of their race, religion and their socio-
economic status. Particularly, equbs are important sources of finance for households 
                                                                                                                                             
2 They are known by the name of ROSCA judges or organiser in Ethiopia. 
who are potentially to be credit constrained
3
.  The sum mobilised by roscas is 
enormous. The estimates reported by Bouman (1995) indicate that saving mobilised by 
equbs is equivalent to 8 to 10 percent of GDP in Ethiopia. In our current sample, the 
reported saving mobilised is 1,147,948 Ethiopian birr
4
 and this is the total sum of 
funds as reported by 284 equb members. Surprisingly, there are not many studies on 
Ethiopian roscas. The very limited literature that exists is very descriptive at best and 
outdated at worst (Aredo, 1993; Begashaw, 1978).  Therefore, it is imperative to 
provide a rigorous and empirical evidence on the workings of this fascinating financial 
institutions.  
 
We are interested to provide an econometric test to the rosca theory developed by the 
seminal contribution of Besley et al (1993) using individual data from urban Ethiopia. 
Particularly we will test whether size of rosca contribution is negatively related to size 
of rosca in the Ethiopian context. We handle this by estimating an equation of monthly 
rosca contribution using different functional forms. There is very limited quantitative 
evidence on determinants of rosca participation particularly at an individual level and 
we will model that using the Heckman selectivity model. Gugerty (2003) argues that 
roscas provide a collective mechanism to discipline their members to save, in the 
presence of time-inconsistent preferences. In our setting, this argument can be tested 
by investigating the relationship between household income and rosca participation. 
As motives to save are increasing in income as shown by Levenson and Besley (1996), 
one expects rosca participation and rosca contributions to increase with household 
income. We estimate a probit equation predicting the probability that an individual 
participates in a rosca.  As argued earlier, very little econometric tests are conducted to 
corroborate or challenge the economic theory on roscas. Our work will be one of the 
very few tests of the economic theory of roscas on a data set from Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Our data gives us a unique opportunity to undertake the tasks we set out to do because 
it contains individual level, household level and rosca level characteristics. It also has 
information on participants and non-participants of formal and informal financial 
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 The Ethiopian birr is the national currency. The exchange rate is £1=15.2 as of 1/12/03.  Therefore, the 
saving mobilised by our equbs is equivalent to £75,522 which amounts to a per capita saving of £266 or 
4042 Ethiopian birr and this is a substantial amount of money holding by Ethiopian standards.  
institutions
5
. Our test is conducted on urban household data set where the formal sector 
is believed to be dominant and it is interesting to examine the characteristics of urban 
dwellers that participate in informal saving institutions. This can be a fundamental 
starting point to answer some thorny issues such as the potential 
complementarity/substitutability of formal and informal financial institutions.   
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two provides an outline of 
the relevant parts of the theoretical model developed by Besley et al (1993) and its 
applicability in the context of the Ethiopian rosca - equb.  Section 3 discusses the data 
used in this study and provides some descriptive statistics about equb and its members 
in Ethiopia. Section 5 discusses the results. Finally the paper concludes and indicates 
future research direction.   
 
II. Theory  
 
We adopt the relevant aspects of the Besley et al (1993) two-good model that derives 
results for random roscas because these are the predominant types of roscas found in 
Ethiopia. In addition, the model compares lifetime utilities of individuals with and 
without rosca membership. Given the fact that we have individual data, it is more 
appropriate to work under that framework and put the predictions of the model to test.  
The model makes the following assumptions. A group of n individuals would like to 
own an indivisible durable good. The individuals have no access to credit markets. 
Each individual lives for T years, receiving an exogenous flow of income over a 
lifetime of y>0. Individuals have identical, intertemporally additive preferences. The 
services of the durable good are not fungible across individuals. In other words, the 
good yields a constant flow of services and an individual must own it to benefit from 
its services.  
 
If v(1,c) is the utility from non-durable consumption, c, if the durable is owned and 
v(0,c) is the same utility if the durable is not owned, δ v(c) =v(1,c) – v(0,c). Given θ  
as the probability of owning the good, the expected utility is  
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 Even if the latter is the focus of this study, we link our current analysis with participation in formal 
),0()1(),1(),( cvcvcv θθθ −+=    (1) 
 
The model results are validated by imposing the conditions that δ v(c)>0 and 
δ v’(c)≥0 and these conditions are assumptions about the structure of preferences. 
The first condition states that the durable is liked by the individuals and the second 
assumes that the marginal utility of non-durable consumption is not decreasing by 
owning the indivisible good suggesting complimentarity between durable services and 
non-durable consumption. 
 
The theoretical literature on roscas argues that agents gain from intertemporal trade by 
joining rosca. This implies that the lifetime utility of the individual who decides to 
save alone (i.e. autarky) is lower relative to the individual who joins a (random) rosca. 
The following few lines briefly show the comparison of lifetime utilities from saving 
with and without rosca membership.   
 
Utility from  Autarkic Saving   
 
An individual may save B at a constant rate (y-c) over an interval [0,t]. Under autarky, 
the individual maximises his/her lifetime utility by choosing t and c.  
 
)]},0([*)],1([*){(
,
cvtyvtTMax
ct
+−    (2) 
s.t. 
t*[y-c]=B and yc ≤≤0  
 
where y= income of the individual. 
T-t= a period or the years the individual lives without saving to buy the durable good 
B= total saving upto point t or cost of the indivisible 
(y-c)= contribution each time 
The first term of (2) represents the utility if the individual owns the durable and the 
second term refers to lifetime utility if the individual does not own the durable. 
Solving the constraint for t and substitution into (2) gives the maximand; 
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function measuring the extent of welfare improvement. Note that 10 ≤≤ q  and it is 
obvious that under autarky q=0. Hence the individual’s utility under autarky is; 
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The first term represents lifetime utility if the durable were free, while the second term 
is the minimum utility cost of saving up for the durable.  The minimisation trades off 
the benefit of a shorter accumulation period against the benefit of higher consumption 
during this period. Under autarky, no individual has the durable good before t at which 
time all n individuals have it. Each person saves at the rate (y-c)=B/t and after an 
interval t/n, there are enough savings to buy an indivisible good. This makes autarky 
inefficient because the individual will have to wait until t to have enough saving to buy 
the durable good. Saving through random rosca avoids the inefficiency given the cost 
function (.).µ  
 
Utility from Saving through Random Rosca 
 
Suppose there is a random roscca formed by n members and they meet at equally 
spaced dates  upto t (i.e. t/n, 2t/n,…,t) with contributions at each meeting. Individuals 
save at rate B/t and expect to receive the durable t[(n-1)/2n] sooner. Clearly, all 
members of a random rosca are better by saving through the rosca than saving alone 
except for the last recipient of the pot.  A representative member of the rosca views his 
receipt date for the pot as a random variable, τ~ , distributed uniformly on the set {t/n, 
2t/n,…,t}. Given c, each member’s lifetime utility is the random variable; 
),1(*)()1(*)~(),0(*~ yvtTcvtcv −+−−+ ττ  (5) 
Since t
n
n
E *
2
1
)~( 


 +=τ , each member’s ex-ante welfare6 is; 
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The group’s problem is now to choose t (hence c) to maximise (6). Besley et al (1993) 
have shown that the maximum life time utility for the representative random rosca 
member is  
]
2
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−
−= µ    (7) 
Clearly the utility under random rosca ( rw ) is greater than the utility under autarky 
( aw ) since 0(.)' >µ and  1)
2
1
( <
−
n
n
. As postulated earlier, welfare is equivalent to the 
difference between what lifetime utility would be were the durable a free good and the 
minimal (expected) utility cost of saving for its purchase. This cost is lower under (7) 
than under (4) which makes random roscas as efficient routes of saving as opposed to 
saving alone (autarky). The model showed the gains from inter-temporal trade as the 
major motivation of the rosca. One of the most important theoretical predictions 
expressed in the constraint of  equation (2) is the inverse relationship between amount 
of contribution per unit of time (i.e. y-c) and size of rosca (n). We know that t*(y-c)=B 
or y-c=B/t or B/n. in the words of Besley et al (1993) this means “…the duration of the 
Rosca will be inversely proportional to the rate at which the group saves…”. 
Alternatively, the larger the size of the individual contribution per rosca member, the 
smaller the number of rosca members and the shorter the rosca duration.  
 
III. Data and Descriptive statistics 
 
The data used in this study were collected in 1994 from seven urban centres in 
Ethiopia. A total of 1500 households were interviewed to provide information on 
household demographics, income, expenditure, education, assets, health and 
individual/household participation in formal and informal financial institutions. The 
information on equbs asks whether any member of the household is a member of equb, 
the frequency of saving per month, amount of equb contribution per month, amount 
paid out by equb and amount expected to be received from equb. We linked the 
identification (id) code of equb members with the id code from the demographic file to 
define individual characteristics of equb participants such as gender, age, level of 
schooling, labour market status, ethnic origin and religious affiliation. Due to the rich 
array of information at our disposal we also defined equb specific characteristics such 
as size of equb contribution and size of equb. From other sections of the data we 
defined household specific characteristics such as household welfare indicators such as 
total household expenditure, food expenditure, household size, demographic 
composition and location.  
 
The data sheds light on some of the controversial questions in the literature. For 
instance, we are interested to know the answer for the questions; Why do households 
save through equb? Table 1 lists, in order of importance, the purpose of membership in 
equbs as reported by participants. Consistent with the lumpy durable purchase 
argument, over 45 percent of our respondents save to buy consumer durables. By far, 
this is the most important reason why individuals in urban Ethiopia join equb. About 
one-fifth (20%) of the individuals joined equb to save without mentioning the reason 
why the saving is being made. This can defensibly be thought of as precautionary 
saving which can be put to use in times of shocks (e.g. consumption smoothing). A 
non-negligible proportion of respondents join equb to use the funds for investment 
reasons (about 17.4) and just under 10 percent of them save for altruistic reasons either 
to support some of their family member and/or friends.  
Table 1: Purpose of Equb Membership 
Purpose  Number of rosca members (%) 
To buy consumer durables  176 (45.2) 
To save 81 (20.8) 
To start/ expand  business 68 (17.4) 
To help friends  and solve family problem  32 (8.1) 
Other (rent, education expenses, building 
a house …etc)  
28 (7.1) 
To buy food  10 (2.5) 
To repay debts/to pay water and 
electricity bills 
7 (1.7) 
All  389 (100) 
N.B. More than one purpose has been given by respondents but only the primary reason has been 
counted to compute the frequencies reported in the table.    
 
 
Before the discussion of the basic information about equbs and the characteristics of 
equb participants as well as non-participants, we briefly look at who from a given 
household is more likely to be a member of equb.  As expected, table 2 indicates that 
household heads and their partners are the ones who usually join equbs given their 
strength in income generation capacity relative to other household members. However, 
children and other household members can also make savings through roscas. This can 
be taken as an indirect evidence of the existence of child labour. 
 
Table 2: Who is the Who is the member of equb? Frequency by city 
Relationship to the Head  Numbers (%)  
Head  258 (64.1) 
Spouse/partner of head  105 (24.9) 
Children   30 (7.5) 
Others  10 (2.5) 
All  403(100) 
 
Table 3 gives the background information on the equbs that our respondents joined. 
The size of equbs is modest  24 being the median number of members and the duration 
of roscas is on average one year. But over 25 percent of the equbs last longer than 52 
weeks and 10 of them running for over 100 weeks. This is a similar length of time as 
found by Anderson and Baland (2002) for roscas in a Kenyan slum. The most common 
forms of equb meetings are the ones taking place weekly (in about 38 percent of the 
cases) and monthly (in over 50 percent of the cases). This is mainly due to the 
necessity of a stable source of income to make equb contributions which often 
coincides with the monthly rosca cycle.  
Table 3: Basic information on equbs 
Variable  All roscas 
Number of members (median) 24 
Weeks existed (median) 52 
Contribute daily (% of roscas) 2.8 
Contribute weekly 37.7 
Contribute fortnightly 6.1 
Contribute monthly 49.6 
Monthly contribution (median) 50 
No of observations  362 
 
We then briefly examine the broad characteristics of the individuals who participate in 
roscas and those who did not. Table 4 compares the characteristics of these two groups 
of individuals and we highlight the most notable ones. It is evident that equb members 
are richer, live in households with large number of members and children. This 
suggests that equbs are not necessarily saving arrangements either for the poor (e.g. 
large households) or the rich (e.g. total/food expenditure). They are used by both types 
of households. The proportion of females in equbs is much higher than among non-
equb members. Another interesting finding is the high proportion of illiterate 
individuals among non-equb members.  Most of the equb members are either primary 
or secondary school graduates. It is interesting to know that even individuals with 
higher degree qualification (individuals with a high propensity to save through interest 
bearing formal routes) are members of equb.  
Table 4: Characteristics of Equb and non-Equb participants 
Variable  Rosca members  Non-rosca 
members 
Mean characteristics    
Total monthly rosca contribution (mean) 179.85   
Age  23.9 27.8 
Household total expenditure 891.0 742.7 
Household food expenditure  580.7 453.9 
Household size 6.71 5.98 
Number of children  2.1 1.92 
Percentages    
Females 68.2 53.6 
Illiterate 12.22 33.1 
Primary schooling  33.03 23.4 
Secondary schooling 35.1 35.0 
Tertiary schooling  7.5 8.5 
Number of observations 362 1164 
 
 IV. Empirical Estimates 
 
Determinants of equb participation 
 
To investigate the determinants of equb participation, we estimate a probit equation 
predicting the probability of participation.  In order to examine the implications of the 
above model, we also estimate an equation of monthly equb contribution. We do so 
under different functional forms. First we allow for the possibility that the estimation 
of total equb contribution is not independent of the probability of joining an equb. As 
an alternative to the Heckman selectivity model, we could have used a Tobit 
estimation where it would have been implicit that a zero equb contribution is 
equivalent to choosing not to participate in an equb. This route seems somewhat 
restrictive given that the decision to participate in an equb can be a separate 
phenomenon to simply making very small contributions. Second, we estimate the 
contribution equation using OLS. We discuss of the results in the following few 
paragraphs.  
 
Table 5 reports the results from the probit regression of the probability that an 
individual belongs to equb
7
.  First we discuss the impact of individual characteristics 
on equb participation. The age of the individual is significantly related to the 
probability of joining equb. The relationship is quadratic (U-shaped) and it suggests 
that the demand for indivisible goods tends to be lower among the young and higher 
among the elderly. The result is different from findings found elsewhere (see Anderson 
and Baland, 2002 for Kenya;  Levenson and Besley, 1996 for Taiwan). Gender is the 
most important determinant of rosca participation and females have a higher 
probability of being rosca members (Anderson and Baland, 2002). To capture the 
impact of cultural factors on rosca participation we include religion and ethnic 
dummies as regressors. The result shows that muslims are less likely to join equb. This 
is surprising because Muslims often do not use banks as saving vehicles because such 
deposits are interest bearing.  Our expectation was to observe them to use equbs which 
are interest free saving schemes. Ethnic identity is not significant suggesting that 
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belonging to a specific ethnic group is not associated with the possibility of informal 
collective arrangements in urban Ethiopia. As proxies for familiarity or trust , the 
ethnic dummies were expected to be significant. Among the education variables, only 
one is negative and significant. If the individual has finished a secondary education, 
he/she is less likely to join equb and this might relate to the limited access that 
secondary graduates have to regular employment income in Ethiopia.  
 
Except for demographic variables, most of the household characteristics were not 
found to be significant including the measure of household welfare. The household 
welfare measure is food expenditure instead of total expenditure because we believe 
that total household expenditure is endogenous to equb participation. Hence we 
estimated the equation using food expenditure because it is independent of durable 
good expenditure. This variable is found to be insignificant
8
.  Household size is 
negatively related to participation while the number of economically active members 
and the elderly has a positive and significant impact on equb participation probability. 
The negative coefficient for household size is consistent to the argument that larger 
households are more likely to be income-poor and hence do not have the means to 
participate. For regressors such as the number of children we expect an increase in the 
need to join equb as the number increases. The positive link emerges from the 
estimates but it is not significant.  
Table 5: Probability of Equb participation: first stage of Heckman selectivity model  
Variable  Marginal Effects 
Constant  0.147 (1.5) 
Individual characteristics   
Age -0.024 (5.6)*** 
Age 2   0.0002 (4.9)*** 
Female  0.934 (66.4)*** 
Other Christians (excluded)  
Orthodox Christian   -0.072 (1.1) 
Muslim  -0.067 (2.5)** 
Primary (excluded)  
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 However, when we include total household expenditure, we obtained a significant positive coefficient 
for this regressor. The square term is found to be insignificant as in the case of food expenditure.  
No education  0.013 (0.5) 
Secondary Schooling   -0.069 (2.1)** 
Higher education  -0.042 (1.5) 
Household characteristics   
Total food expenditure  0.5D-04 (1.2) 
Total food expenditure 2   -0.4D-08 (0.3) 
Kids below 6 (excluded)  
Household size -0.051 (2.9)*** 
Children aged 6 to 15 0.024 (1.3) 
Members aged 16 to 55 0.065 (3.5)*** 
Elderly aged above 55 0.106 (3.7)*** 
Actual 1s and 0s correctly predicted  96.9% 
Log-likelihood -158.59 
No of observations  1478 
N.B. t-ratios in parentheses. Other controls included but not reported due to statistical insignificance are 
dummies indicating location, ethnicity and labour market status of the individual.  
 
Determinants of size of equb contribution 
 
The major part of our study is to provide econometric tests of the theoretical 
predictions advanced in the rosca literature which include the inverse relationship 
between rosca size and rosca contribution; and also between the frequency of draw and 
the volume of saving per unit of time. Table 6 presents the different estimation results 
on determinants of size of equb contribution using individual, household and equb 
level characteristics. The results under the different functional forms are consistent 
with the theoretical predictions reproduced above. Column 1 gives the second stage 
estimates of the Heckman selectivity model. The significant inverse Mill’s ratio clearly 
shows the dependence of the decision to join equb and the decision on the amount of 
equb contribution conditional participation. Age of the individual is a significant 
determinant of equb contribution. There is no significant quadratic relationship 
between the age of the participant and the size of the contribution. Gender of the 
individual has a significant impact on contribution. In conjunction with the findings 
from the first stage estimates, this indicates that females are not only more likely to 
join equb but they also tend to make more monthly equb contribution. As expected, the 
labour market situation of the individual is also a significant determinant of the size of 
contribution. It is also convincing to observe, a significant and positive relationship 
between wage employment and equb contribution. Household food expenditure has a 
significant non-linear relationship. The result suggests that as household welfare 
increases the contribution to equb increases but not monotonically as it falls at high 
level of food expenditure. Except for the number of elderly household members, none 
of the demographic variables were significant determinants of contribution. Relative to 
being living in a household that is in Mekele, individuals who live in the rest of the six 
urban centres make more equb contribution. With regard to equb level characteristics, 
the size of equb (i.e. number of members in an equb) is inversely related with monthly 
equb contribution. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction discussed earlier 
and the findings by Hinda and Kirton (1999) for Jamaica. The prediction regarding the 
relationship between frequency of draw/saving and volume of saving is also supported. 
For instance, if the individual belongs to a daily equb, the saving allocations per unit of 
time decrease. However, in weekly and monthly roscas, the members are often well-
off with regular incomes (e.g. employees with monthly salaries) and hence the 
contributions increase if the individual is a member in an equb with weekly and 
monthly allocations.  
 
Column 2 gives the OLS regression estimates assuming exogeneity of the frequency of 
rosca contribution. All the above significant results hold except for dummies for 
gender, most of location dummies and one of the frequency of draw variables (i.e. 
weekly). The most important point to bear in mind here is that the theoretical 
predications with regard to frequency of draw, size of equb and size of equb 
contribution are still confirmed by our results. One interesting result relates to ethnic 
identity. If the individual is from the Gurage ethnic group (a group mainly engaged in 
running small and big businesses), rosca contribution increase. In addition, anecdotal 
evidence abounds about the strict saving behaviour of this group which might have 
been picked up here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6: Regression results for the determinants of amount of Equb contribution  
Variables  Heckman 2-stage  
(1) 
OLS
9
 
(2) 
Constant  - 2.344 
(4.1)*** 
Individual characteristics   
Age -0.0479 (1.7)* -0.061(2.0)** 
Age 2   0.3D-03 (0.8) 07D-03(1.4) 
Female  1.228(2.9)*** -0.170(0.6) 
Employed  0.575 (3.6)*** 0.630(3.8)*** 
Other ethnic 
groups(excluded) 
  
Amhara  - 0.253(1.5) 
Oromo  - -0.016(0.1) 
Tigre  - 0.214(0.9) 
Gurage  - 0.416(2.3)** 
Household characteristics   
Food expenditure  0.002(7.7)*** 0.002(6.5)*** 
Food expenditure 2   -0.4D-06(3.2)*** -0.3D-06(2.4)** 
Elderly aged above 55 0.386(2.4)** 0.359(2.4)** 
Mekele (excluded)   
Addis Ababa 0.666(2.9)*** 0.378(1.1) 
Awasa 0.792(2.6)** 0.422(1.0) 
Bahar Dar 0.979(3.5)*** 0.686(1.9)* 
Desie 0.698(2.1)** 0.295(0.7) 
Diredawa  1.017(2.8)*** 0.889(2.0)** 
Jimma 0.863(2.8)*** 0.614(1.6) 
Rosca characteristics   
Size of rosca  -0.003 (3.3)*** -0.003(3.2)*** 
Fortnightly (excluded)   
                                                 
9
 To allow for the endogeneity of the frequency of saving through equb, we will produce also IV 
estimates using pay period (i.e. for the wage income of equb members) as potential instruments.  
Daily a   -1.495(3.4)*** -1.678(3.6)*** 
Weekly a  0.389(2.1)** 0.176(0.9) 
Monthly a   1.172(5.9)*** 0.928(4.3)*** 
Lambda  0.890 (4.0)*** - 
F-statistics  16.99 14.11 
R 2  0.55 0.56 
No of observations  349 349 
N.B. 
a
Treated as endogenous in the last column. Instruments are variables indicating whether the wage 
pay period is daily, weekly and monthly. Ethnic and Religion dummies were used as identifying 
restrictions in the Heckman Two Stage model. ***; ** and *=significant  at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
respectively. Schooling and demographic composition variables were included as controls in all 
functional forms but not reported as they  were insignificant. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The study presented some econometric evidence using data on equbs (Ethiopian 
roscas) from seven major urban centres in Ethiopia. A number of theoretical 
predictions have been supported by our data. We obtained an inverse relationship 
between equb contribution and size of equb (Besley et at 1993; Hand and Kirton, 
1999); most of the equb participants join the informal saving scheme to buy consumer 
durables (Handa and Kirton, 1999); the larger proportion of rosca members are 
females (Anderson and Baland, 2002); a negative relationship between frequency of 
draw and volume of saving; and, finally, richer households tend to join equb 
(Levensohn and Besley, 1996).  
 
Some of the future possible direction of this study include the need to allow for the 
endogeneity of the frequency of saving in the contribution equation. Because our data 
consist of information on employment of individuals, we will produce also IV 
estimates using pay period as potential instruments. More important and worthwhile 
future exercise is the investigation of household participation in formal and informal 
financial institution. Again very little is known about the micro-level determinants of 
individual/household participation in the various instruments. We focus on saving 
through banks and roscas as these represent the prevalent forms of saving. Some work 
has already been done.  Bivariate probit equations estimated to test whether saving in 
formal institutions (banks) are substitutes/complements for saving in informal 
institutions (such as equbs). The results indicate a statistically significant term for ρ  
which suggests that informal saving mechanisms are perfect substitutes for the formal 
saving institutions in the urban centres of Ethiopia.  
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